Mortality rates for patients with acute myocardial infarction (AMI) vary substantially across hospitals, even when adjusted for patient severity; however, little is known about hospital factors that may influence this variation.
M
ortality rates for patients with acute myocardial infarction (AMI) vary substantially across U.S. hospitals, even when adjusted for severity of the condition (1, 2) . Despite national reductions in AMI mortality rates in the past decade (3), 30-day risk-standardized mortality rates (RSMRs) for patients hospitalized with AMI vary as much as 2-fold between the highest and lowest hospitals (1) . Previous studies have identified hospital volume (4, 5) , urban location (6), teaching status (1, 7), geographic region (1, 8, 9) , safety net status (10) , and patient socioeconomic status (11) as correlates of AMI mortality rates. However, even together, these factors leave much of the variation in RSMRs unexplained (11) , and they are also not readily modifiable.
Previous studies have had important limitations. They have not had the ability to use a national outcomes measure (RSMR) to systematically identify hospitals with contrasting levels of performance. They also have not explored factors that could influence hospital performance but are difficult to measure quantitatively. The value of current evidence is therefore limited for clinicians and managers who seek interventions to reduce mortality among patients with AMI.
We sought to inform the development of hypotheses regarding what works inside a hospital to achieve better 30-day mortality outcomes for patients with AMI, using the positive deviance approach (12) (13) (14) (www.positivedeviance.org). A key component of this approach is to study positive deviants (organizations with exceptionally high performance) by using qualitative methods to identify factors that enable these organizations to achieve top performance. We examined complex work processes, social interactions, and organizational culture and norms, which are difficult to measure quantitatively (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) but have been important in literature outside health care (20 -22) for distinguishing the outcomes of top-performing organizations.
METHODS

Study Design and Sample
We arrayed hospitals according to their RSMR, as reported by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Hospitals that ranked in either the top or the bottom 5% of performance during both years were selected. Because we sought to inform the generation of hypotheses that could be transferred (23) to a broader range of hospitals, our sample hospitals were diverse in characteristics (18) previously shown to be related to RSMRs. We excluded hospitals that reported during screening that they did not have the capability to perform primary percutaneous coronary intervention to target hospitals with sufficient experience with STsegment elevation myocardial infarction. Hospital selection continued until theoretical saturation, the point at which successive site visits generated no new concepts, was reached (24) .
Data Collection
From December 2008 to December 2009, we conducted in-depth interviews with key hospital staff who were most involved with AMI care, with an average of 14 interviews per hospital. Our team had members with backgrounds in cardiology, emergency medicine, health services research, quality improvement, nursing, organizational psychology, and social work; all had experience in conducting in-depth interviews. Each site visit included 3 to 4 researchers. Interviews were typically 1 hour in duration, followed a standard discussion guide (Table 1) , and were audiotaped and professionally transcribed. An organizational psychologist conducted formal debriefing sessions with each site visit team (18) to inform subsequent data analyses.
Data Analysis
A 6-member multidisciplinary team performed data analysis by using the constant comparison method (25, 26) , in which essential concepts from interview data are coded and compared over successive interviews to extract recurrent themes across the data. Other team members reviewed coded transcripts for the site visits they had conducted. This process of refining codes and describing the properties of each continued until no new concepts emerged. Targeted analyses were performed to examine the consistency of the data within sites and to identify distinctions in coded themes between highperforming and low-performing hospitals.
We used ATLAS.ti Scientific Software, version 6.1 (ATLAS.ti, Berlin, Germany).
Role of the Funding Source
Our study was funded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, United Health Foundation, and the Commonwealth Fund. The funding sources had no involvement in the design or conduct of the study, data management or analysis, manuscript preparation, review, or authorization for submission.
RESULTS
Study Hospitals and Staff
The 11 participating hospitals varied in teaching status, size, geographic location, and socioeconomic status (27, 28) of their patients with AMI ( Table 2) . Table 3 lists the characteristics of the 158 interviewed staff members.
Domains of Organizational Performance
Six broad domains characterized participants' experiences in hospitals with high and low RSMR performance: hospital protocols and processes for AMI care, organiza- AMI ϭ acute myocardial infarction; QI ϭ quality improvement.
Context
The reasons for variation in mortality rates for patients with acute myocardial infarction (AMI) among hospitals are not well understood.
Contribution
This study of high-and low-performing hospitals found that hospitals with better mortality rates were characterized by shared organizational values and goals, senior management involvement, broad staff presence and expertise in AMI care, communication and coordination among groups, and problem solving and learning.
Caution
This qualitative study generates hypotheses but could not test them.
Implication
Studies that focus on guidelines, hospitalists, rapidresponse teams, and other clinically oriented advances should consider the importance of the additional characteristics of top-performing hospitals identified in this study.
-The Editors
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Top-Performing Hospitals in AMI Mortality Rates tional values and goals, senior management involvement, broad staff presence and expertise in AMI care, communication and coordination among groups, and problem solving and learning ( Table 4) . High-performing and lowperforming hospitals differed markedly in 5 of these domains; however, we found no systematic differences in hospital protocols and processes for AMI care between high-performing and low-performing hospitals. Here, we describe the domains and key themes, with representative quotations from study participants for selected themes. The Appendix Table ( available at www.annals.org) contains additional quotations.
Hospital Protocols and Processes for AMI Care
All participants described concrete protocols and practices undertaken by hospitals to reduce mortality among patients with AMI. None of these practices was consistently present in the high-performing hospitals or consistently absent in the low-performing hospitals. Rather, participants from all hospitals reported using a range of practices in varying combinations and degrees of intensity and form. No single practice or set of practices emerged as key to reducing AMI mortality. As the Director, Quality Management, of hospital 9 reflected after an external audit of performance problems in AMI care, "There was no 'Ah ha!' . . . We spent years trying to find the silver bullet that would fix everything, and . . . there is no one issue [in which] we were doing something glaringly wrong."
Organizational Values and Goals
Staff at high-performing hospitals expressed shared organizational values of providing exceptional, high-quality care. These values were reflected in "a common vision and purpose," referred to as the "glue" (cardiologist, hospital 7) and "the driving force behind everything" (case manager, hospital 3). A nurse manager from hospital 4 described this pursuit of excellence: "[We are] constantly resetting that bar. . . . [I]f you aim for As, you get As, and if you accept Zs, that's what you get. We don't accept anything less than the very best." Clinical and administrative staff recognized that aligning multiple goals was central to fulfilling this vision and viewed achieving high-quality patient outcomes as consistent with achieving positive financial outcomes for the organization.
A shared vision of excellence in clinical care was not readily apparent in low-performing hospitals, as observed by the Medical Director of hospital 9: "The hospital likes to get disease-specific certification . . . Senior management and governing boards in the highperforming hospitals demonstrated unwavering commitment to high-quality AMI care by providing adequate financial and nonfinancial resources. Senior management also relied on quality data in strategic planning efforts and resource allocation decisions and strove to "create a culture where, where [data are] embedded" (Chief of Medicine, hospital 4). By using data openly and consistently, management fostered staff accountability for poor performance and recognized staff for high performance. Sporadic involvement of senior management was common in low-performing hospitals, in part because of frequent turnover, as reported by this case manager from hospital 11: "I have been here only seven years; this is the third 
Broad Staff Presence and Expertise in AMI Care
Staff in high-performing hospitals reported the presence of physician champions and empowered nursing staff, pharmacist involvement in patient care, and high qualification standards for all staff. A senior administrator from hospital 2 described the "passion on the part of physician leaders to continually hit that mark and for the best outcomes in the world." Nurses in these hospitals were also central to improvement efforts and were empowered to challenge the status quo. In low-performing hospitals, physician presence in championing AMI quality improvement efforts was weak or nonexistent. The Medical Director of Emergency Services at hospital 9 described the consequences of the lack of physician leadership on an AMI committee as follows: "[T]here's not enough physician leadership on the committee. . . . [T]he people who are in charge . . . often show up and there's no doc there, and they . . . try to implement changes. . . . Every once and a while they get it a little bit wrong."
Nurses in low-performing hospitals were not consistently treated as valued members of a team and were typically expected to simply carry out physician instructions.
It is just real discouraging to the nurse . . . that whole medication reconciliation . . . and just having that doctor-nurse conversation. Sometimes cardiologists are a little bit of bears and are not the kindest, and so nurses will call about meds and they say: "I gave you orders, and what are you calling me again for?" (Critical care nurse, hospital 9) Similarly, pharmacist roles were typically narrowly circumscribed, and they had limited participation in clinical decisions. In general, low-performing hospitals faced substantial challenges in attracting and retaining skilled and experienced clinical staff, as observed by a critical care nurse at hospital 10: "I have a large majority of nurses that aren't intensive care-trained, and so I'm trying to hire some that are more experienced, but right now . . . it [is] difficult to get someone to come here."
Communication and Coordination Among Groups
Strong communication and coordination were apparent across both disciplines and departments at high- The flow of information was constrained in lowperforming hospitals by poor structural supports (such as irregular committee meetings or inefficient information technology) and inadequate transparency. Lack of respect for diverse roles was expressed in multiple ways, and participants described staff isolation rather than interdependencies.
I actually saw a physician . . . walk into a room to examine a patient and hand his suit coat to a nurse who stood in the corner . . . while he examined the patient. I thought, you've got to be kidding me. . . . I think that that has the potential to get in the way of patient care. 
Problem Solving and Organizational Learning
Staff in high-performing hospitals described routinely having positive experiences with problem solving and organizational learning. Adverse events were viewed as opportunities to analyze root causes, learn from experiences, and improve care. Participants reported incorporating data feedback into the organizational culture with a nonpunitive approach to problem solving, which focused on learning rather than blaming. As the Chief Executive Officer of hospital 2 reported:
There are 4 stages in dealing with adverse events: The data are wrong; the data are correct but it's not a problem; the data are correct and it's a problem, but it's not my problem; the data are correct and I own the responsibility to fix the problem. . . . [T]his organization [is at] the level of "the data are correct and I own the responsibility to fix the problem." I think that's really the key.
Quality improvement team members characterized their teams as thriving on innovation and creativity as they persevered in trial-and-error efforts. In addition, staff frequently sought expertise outside the hospital to solve problems and learn new approaches.
. . . the performance improvement team . . . identifies action steps, the plan is put in place, and then we continue to measure to see if it's working or not working. . . . [Y]ou identify, you intervene, you improve, you monitor, you tweak, and that's the model that they've been using for 10 years. (Director, Quality Management, hospital 4)
We send our staff from the east coast to the west coast to see what the latest technology is. . . . [W]e can either improve upon that or say that that's not the right thing Participants at low-performing hospitals described minimal or very recent use of formal problem-solving tools, such as root-cause analysis, and variable interest in data. The approach to problem solving was generally less constructive, and finger-pointing was more commonplace. As the Vice President of Quality Improvement at hospital 8 noted:
[In quality improvement meetings, you hear] "What can I do about that stupid ED [emergency department]? They can't get anything done." Too often those kinds of discussions really become about finger-pointing.
Low-performing hospitals did not uniformly encourage innovation by frontline staff or learning from others within the organization; the Director of Performance Improvement at hospital 10 commented that "the biggest challenge is getting 'buy-in' for something very new, from the ground floor. . . . that always seems to take months." Participants also indicated an inadequate emphasis on learning from other hospitals; the Chief of Cardiology at hospital 8 expressed this as, "I would like to see more collaboration between different hospitals . . . 
DISCUSSION
To our knowledge, this is the first qualitative study of hospitals at different ends of the performance spectrum of publicly reported mortality measures for AMI. We found marked differences in their organizational approaches in terms of organizational values and goals, senior management involvement, broad staff presence and expertise in AMI care, communication and coordination among groups, and problem solving and learning. Protocols and processes for AMI care did not differ between highperforming and low-performing hospitals. The implication of our findings is that challenges for performance improvement in the broad outcome measure of RSMR are complex and, in the absence of a supportive organizational culture, specific interventions may not be sufficient for achieving the highest performance in care for patients with AMI. Our findings differ from those of many previous studies, which identified specific determinants of high performance in other measures of AMI quality, such as ␤-blocker use or door-to-balloon time (29, 30) ; this research led to extensive efforts to adopt the best practices and reduce delays nationally (31, 32).
What are the mechanisms by which these organizational features might reduce risk for death within 30 days of admission for patients with AMI? First, having clear values and goals to be the best, coupled with the strong engagement from staff members of diverse disciplines, senior management, and staff, focuses attention and resources on the issue of quality of care. Second, medical errors and preventable deaths occur in part because of poor communication (33) (34) (35) or "dropping the ball" during transitions of care (36) , which suggests that strong communication and coordination among groups probably limit errors in transitions and enable a more reliable and safe environment at a hospital. Finally, solving problems in a way that seeks and addresses root causes, a practice that was endemic in the topperforming hospitals, may ensure that difficulties in processes are addressed swiftly and routinely and reduce the risk inherent in the hospitalization and complex clinical care of patients with AMI.
Although we used recommended techniques (15, 18, 37, 38) to enhance the rigor of our findings, our study has limitations. First, we visited hospitals at a single point in time. The low-performing hospitals could have been on a trajectory toward improvement that was not captured in our data. However, we did compute RSMRs over a 3-year period among selected hospitals and found little movement in rank among them. Second, social desirability response bias (39), in which participants misrepresent their improvement efforts to provide desirable answers, may have occurred. We interviewed several staff members in each hospital, used scripted probes to elicit details that would be difficult to misrepresent, and instructed respondents to share both positive and negative experiences. Third, hospitals could not be blinded to the reason for selection, which could have led to response bias, such as low-performing hospitals highlighting more negative aspects of care. We found no evidence of such bias in the organizational practices domain, and it seems unlikely that bias would occur only in selected domains. Fourth, although we included high-performing hospitals in lower socioeconomic settings and low-performing hospitals in high socioeconomic settings, we could not explore the potential role of financial resources on RSMR. Finally, our study identified conceptual domains that we hypothesized would influence RSMR; specific measurement of these concepts is needed to test these hypotheses quantitatively in future studies with a larger, representative sample of hospitals.
In summary, protocols and processes for AMI care are likely to be central to improving outcomes; however, our findings suggest that achieving high performance may require long-term investment and concerted efforts to create an organizational culture that supports full engagement in quality, strong communication and coordination among groups, and the capacity for problem solving and learning across the organization. 
